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Introduction
This work is based on a series of in-depth interviews conducted with present and 
former participants of the movement of political protest formed by the “popular” 
or “neighborhood” assemblies founded in buenos aires around the end of 2001 
and the beginning of 2002. Discourses produced in exceptional times tend to be 
profoundly revealing of ordinary, widely shared notions. Thus, the aim of this 
work consists in analyzing the discourse about political representation and de-
liberation that constituted the axis of the aforementioned experience, which took 
place in the midst of a deep crisis of representation. More specifically, it seeks 
to analyze the discourse of assembly members about the assemblies and their 
practices; about representation, delegation, participation, political parties, repre-
sentative democracy and direct democracy in order to apprehend their underlying 
conceptions of representation, its paradoxes, its potential and its limits.
What kind of space for participation and deliberation were the assemblies? What 
stance did they take towards the institutions of political representation? Did they pres-
ent themselves as a complement, a correction, or an alternative to their deficiencies 
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and failures? What were the reasons for their rapid decline; what remained from them 
in the deep layers of argentine politics? These are some of the questions that we try 
to answer through the analysis of the discourse of present and former participants of 
the assemblies, the appearance and rapid multiplication of which we locate at the in-
tersection of two distinct processes: on the one hand, the slow, generalized and long-
term process of metamorphosis of representation, conducive from “party democracy” 
to “audience democracy”; on the other hand, the crisis of representation, an explosive 
phenomenon, limited in time and space, characterized by the very absence of recog-
nition of the representative bond on the part of the represented.
This analysis is not based on a representative sample of the universe under 
study. The main reason for that is the absence of complete knowledge of that uni-
verse, which is the direct effect of the peculiar nature of the assembly movement. 
We are indeed dealing with a fluid movement of undefined limits, with highly 
fluctuating numbers of participants over time and with a “membership” that can 
only be estimated, at any given moment, within very wide margins of error. The 
available socioeconomic and demographic classifications of its participants are in-
tuitive at best, based on prejudice at worst. secondly, even if it had been possible 
to design a sample fitted to our object, it would have turned out to be too big for 
our modest means, given all the supposedly relevant variables. our aim has thus 
been to compile a reasonable quantity of discourse from present and past mem-
bers of the assemblies in order to analyze it in the context of all the information 
available from both primary and secondary sources. That is why we discarded the 
possibility of a sample and chose instead to look for as much diversity as possible 
among our interviewees; in other words, we opted for variety instead of statistical 
representation. Thirty-seven detailed interviews were held with twenty-one men 
and sixteen women, whose ages ranged from twenty-three to eighty-five (with the 
highest concentration between forty and fifty years old) and who belonged or had 
belonged to a wide variety of assemblies in the city of buenos aires and, sec-
ondarily, in its metropolitan area. our interviewees diverge widely in occupational 
terms: university students, primary school teachers, merchants, artists and artisans, 
liberal professionals, public employees, unemployed and retired people, and even 
one person that defines himself as an “activist” are included. The group is also di-
verse where previous political experience is concerned: it includes people with no 
political experience who confess that they went through a sort of “second birth” as 
they got involved in a political mobilization for the first time in their lives; others 
that claim to always have had “political interests” but whose previous experience 
was limited to attending demonstrations, mostly related to human rights issues; oth-
ers that were once “sympathizers” of some political party or were briefly members 
of one, most often left-leaning; others who used to have an intense participation in 
a (probably left-wing) political party or while at the university; others who label 
themselves “lifetime activists” and have indeed been members of different parties 
and organizations, but did not belong to any of them at the time of their entry into 
the assembly movement; and others that were politically active as of December, 
73
Inés M. Pousadela
2001, mostly in left leaning political parties. in contrast with the great majority of 
available research –case studies involving one or, more frequently, two assemblies 
in a comparative perspective–, we analyze the experience that took place in a set of 
assemblies as wide and diverse as possible, so as to achieve a characterization di-
vorced from the peculiarities of any particular assembly and from the constellation 
of circumstances that originated and shaped each of them. some of the assemblies 
mentioned no longer existed, while others were still active when the interviews 
took place. Twenty-two of our interviewees still participated in them at that time, 
whereas fifteen of them had already quit. Some of the latter had abandoned either 
because their assemblies had lost dynamism and were almost extinct, or because 
they had been let down for any reason (different aims, ruptures, attempts at coopta-
tion and inefficacy, among others); others, finally, had stopped participating at the 
very moment when their assemblies disappeared.
The fact that our interviews were conducted in the year 2005 demands an 
additional explanation. The time gap between the facts and their narration pres-
ents both advantages and disadvantages. We have tried to capitalize on the bene-
fits of a retrospective look at already concluded processes without being affected 
by the disadvantages related to the intervention of memory, such as the “distor-
tions” that result from oblivion and from the “contamination” with information 
obtained later in time, as well as from the retrospective adaptation to knowledge 
not available at the time of the events. Where necessary, we have compared the 
information offered by the interviewees with data from other sources. however, 
at the center of our attention are the ideas held by our interviewees about political 
representation and their interpretations of the processes they went through rather 
than the empirical accuracy of their recollections.
in the next few pages we offer a reconstruction of the context of the crisis 
of representation of October-December, 2001, based on journalistic and official 
sources, academic material and testimonies from our interviewees. in the third sec-
tion we deal with the emergence of the assembly movement, while in the last one 
we proceed to analyze the discourse of our assembly members on three big issues 
that are revealing of the existence of various visions of representation as well as of 
the depth of its crisis. We analyze the different interpretations of the battle cry of the 
protest of December, 2001, Que se vayan todos (“everyone must leave”); their vi-
sions of the relationships between their assemblies and representative institutions; 
and, last but not least, their descriptions and interpretations of the deliberation and 
decision-making processes that took place within the assemblies, as well as of the 
eventual emergence within them of leaderships and instances of delegation.
Representation in crisis. From electoral outburst
to street mobilization.
first it was the electoral outburst. it was no coincidence that dissatisfaction be-
came apparent when the center-left Ucr-frepaso alliance failed. not only had 
the alliance government inaugurated in 1999 turned out to be particularly inept 
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and lacking in imagination: it also was, from the prevailing point of view at the 
time, the only remaining chance after a radical government (1983-1989) trun-
cated by hyperinflation and a Peronist one (1989-1999) whose heritage was one 
of poverty, unemployment and corruption.
by the time of the 2001 legislative elections the failure of the alliance was 
apparent on all fronts: not only where it had made little or no promise at all but 
also on issues that were at the core of its identity and the satisfaction of which 
depended mostly on political will rather than economic resources. among them 
was the corruption issue, which had been placed by the alliance at the center of 
its 1999 presidential campaign. less than a year after their electoral triumph a 
scandal had exploded after the denunciation of alleged bribes received by sena-
tors in exchange for the passing of a bill introduced by the government. The lack 
of presidential willingness to investigate the facts then became apparent. as a 
result, the vice-president (also president of the senate) resigned and thus broke 
the governing coalition at the end of 2000. The governmental attitude revealed 
to the public the existence of a “political class” in the strong sense of the word, 
that is, of “a caste that permanently recycles itself”, that involves “the whole 
political spectrum” (male, 57, retailer, asamblea popular de pompeya, with pre-
vious political experience), and that is at the base of a “system” that functions 
“unrelated to its specific function”. Politicians, especially those in the legislative 
branch, were thus perceived as representatives unable to represent since “they 
do not relate to us, to citizens’ opinions, and they do not comply with their ba-
sic purpose that is the common good. They form a closed circle aimed at the 
maintenance and the increase of their own power” (female, 60, psychologist, 
Vecinos indignados de Vicente lópez, without previous political experience). 
more than from the results of the judicial process, the relevance of the bribe 
scandal resulted from its verisimilitude for public opinion. in that sense, it was a 
moment of open visibility in which the gap became apparent between the idea of 
democracy as “government by the people” and its factual reality as “government 
by politicians”. politicians that, in addition, were considered to be “all the same”: 
equally “corrupt”, “thieves” and “criminals”, according to the most frequent epi-
thets. only the opening of a window of opportunity was needed for the crisis to 
overtly explode.
That is what eventually happened when mid-term elections were held in oc-
tober, 2001, barely twenty-four months after those 1999 elections characterized 
by mild optimism as menem’s decade-long government drew to a close. how 
did the protest start? explanations based on the sheer enumeration of damage 
are spectacular but ineffective. numerous explanations indeed function on the 
assumption that an accumulation of “objective data” is sufficient as a cause for 
political and social mobilization. We nevertheless know –at least since Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s explanation for the eruption of revolution in France– that no “ob-
jective” information is enough without the intermediation of the imaginary and 
the construction of subjectivities. The abrupt fall of the national gross product, 
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the effects of successive adjustment policies that reached their peak in July in 
election year and the astronomic figures of unemployment and poverty reveal 
nothing by themselves. According to official data, in October, 2001 the unem-
ployment rate was 18.3%, whereas underemployment reached 16.4%. sixteen 
million of the thirty-six million inhabitants of the country were below the poverty 
line and more than five million had fallen below the line of extreme poverty. 
now, why was the explosion to happen when unemployment hit, say, 20%? Why 
not earlier; why not later?
The key is to be found in the ways in which citizens process bare empirical 
data such as country-risk figures or unemployment and poverty rates. Through-
out 2001 argentina’s country-risk mark had been constantly increasing. for 
some time the government tried to prevent the figure from surpassing the line 
that separated attraction of investment from capital flight. By the time the figure 
surpassed all limits, it had become a piece of basic information that any citizen 
apparently needed to know in order to leave their home every morning, as if 
it were the weather forecast –while only experts had known about its very ex-
istence only a few months earlier. The crisis was then perceived in the feeling 
that macro-level variables had direct and immediate effects on everybody’s daily 
lives. The overwhelming sensation was that the news brought by the newspaper 
had the potential to overturn each individual’s fate, which turned out to be in for-
eign, uncontrollable hands. as for unemployment and poverty data, what was at 
stake was the very self-image of argentines, torn to pieces by the fact that there 
were hungry people in a country with a potential to feed the world. Television 
broadcasted images of starving children in the northern provinces; argentina 
started receiving donation shipments from the same european countries whose 
emigrants had populated its territory a century earlier; web sites started spread-
ing among prosperous europeans the idea of fostering an argentine child so she 
could eat and attend school. it was then that argentines suddenly realized that 
they were not as “european” as they had believed themselves to be: not only did 
argentina belong indeed in latin america, but it was also undergoing conditions 
that its middle class plainly identified with Africa. It was, in sum, the image that 
Argentines had of themselves and their future –which seemed to be suddenly cut 
off– which had changed. The collective state of mind had shifted from the eupho-
ria of the nineties to plain self-denigration. This feeling was soon to have a vivid 
translation in the image of the hundreds who lined up at the doors of the spanish 
and italian consulates to get a passport that was the promise of a fresh start in the 
land of their ancestors. The fact that many people left the country in precarious 
conditions was another translation of the reigning sensation that nowhere could 
things be worse.
several months before the elections, the rejection that would become appar-
ent in the polls –and later on in an extra-electoral and even an extra-institutional 
way– was in the air both in streets and in the virtual space of the web turned into 
a forum for citizen expression and communication. Dissatisfaction with the po-
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litical offer abounded, as it was criticized for displaying the same old faces, the 
very senators suspected of receiving bribes in exchange for the passing of a law, 
the unknown people who occupied their congressional seats thanks to the widely 
criticized “blanket lists” (listas sábana) that nobody seemed to be really willing 
to get rid of; in sum, the same politicians that had long been participating, without 
partisan distinctions, in transactional activities resulting in the detour of large 
public funds and the distortion of their mission as representatives of the people. 
in that context, appeals by individual “common citizens” or by ad hoc citizen 
associations mushroomed to cast blank votes or to void the vote by using hand-
made fake ballots instead of the official ones –so as to “vote” for funny fictional 
characters or for respectable historical figures– or by placing in the envelope crit-
ical or insulting messages for politicians or any kind of object that could be used 
to express anger and dissatisfaction. still others refused to sanction the reigning 
lack of options by abstaining: the so-called “kilometer 501” group, for instance, 
planned to deceive the authorities by organizing collective excursions on election 
day to transport voters somewhere more than five hundred kilometers away from 
their voting places, therefore legally exempting them from their electoral duty.
The results of the election were attuned with this climate of opinion. Those 
who did not vote or cast some form of “negative” vote (void or blank) added up 
to more than 40% of all qualified voters, more than the added votes received by 
the two major political parties. Though it varied enormously from one district to 
another, abstention reached an unprecedented 24.58 % at a national level. Void 
and blank votes added up to 23.99 % of the votes cast for national representa-
tives (13.23% and 10.76%, respectively). Those electoral behaviors –more ac-
centuated within urban sectors and among those with a higher socioeconomic or 
educational level– were not an expression of apathy or lack of interest but they 
had –especially the former– an active and even “activist” character. The ava-
lanche of void votes was indeed a novel occurrence. blank votes had slowly but 
continuously increased since the restoration of democracy in 1983; a similar path 
had been followed by abstention, despite voting being compulsory. Until 2001, 
however, surveys showed that the main reasons for abstention were the lack of 
interest and time to sort out information rather than sheer rejection of politics due 
to its identification with corruption (Ferreira Rubio, 1998). That was still not a 
situation of crisis of representation, but the normal (though certainly precarious 
and volatile) state of affairs in the context of the new format of representation that 
had been established gradually since 1983 (pousadela 2004, 2005). The transition 
from “party democracy” towards “audience democracy” –which we describe, 
following Bernard Manin (1992, 1998), as a “metamorphosis of representation”– 
implies indeed a series of transformations. among them can be mentioned the 
personalization of political leaderships, the transformation of parties into de-ide-
ologized electoral machines, the decline of the importance of party programs, the 
growing impact of the mass media –and of television in particular– as a scene 
where political events are produced, the consequent prevalence of image over the 
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debate of ideas, the decline of captive electorates and the fluctuation of the politi-
cal preferences of voters, whose loyalties can no longer be taken for granted. it 
was this situation of apathetic normality that was shaken by the citizens’ electoral 
behavior in october, 2001.
While electoral results and survey data in the previous twenty years had at 
all times adjusted to what was reasonable to expect in the context of audience 
democracy, the events that took place on october 14th, 2001 and in the following 
months took on a completely different shape. They constituted indeed a quali-
tatively different phenomenon: an authentic crisis of representation. from then 
on, the focus was redirected towards the relationship of representation and the 
mechanisms that seemed to make representatives “disloyal” from the very mo-
ment they became so; towards the “political class” rejected for its homogeneity, 
that turned political competition into a useless formality, as well as for its power-
ful corporate interests; and towards the search for alternatives to the conflictive 
relationship between representatives and represented.
Two months after the electoral cataclysm the extra-electoral outburst oc-
curred. The process sped up since the beginning of December, when it became 
apparent that the national government would be unable to honor the service for 
the national debt due at the end of the year. The refusal by the imf to unblock a 
new loan to make sure that those payments could be made and that the minimal 
expenses of the State apparatus could be covered provoked a huge capital flight. 
on December 3rd a decree was enacted that drastically limited cash withdrawals 
from banks; in no time, this policy came to be popularly known as the finan-
cial “corralito”, named after the play pens that will not allow babies to escape 
from adult surveillance. a month later the parity between the peso and the dollar 
on which the stability of the economy had been built a decade earlier was al-
ready history, and savings trapped in banks had undergone a brutal devaluation. 
Thousands of million dollars, mostly held by big business, had nevertheless fled 
abroad. at the same time, strikes of civil servants continued to spread across the 
provinces demanding unpaid wages, converging with the demonstrations staged 
by the movements of unemployed workers who had already been out in the streets 
for a long time making themselves visible through piquetes (pickets) and cortes 
de rutas (roadblocks). on December 12th the first cacerolazo (pot-banging) took 
place in the city of buenos aires, starring middle-class citizens in protest for the 
freezing of their bank accounts. The next day, there was a general strike sum-
moned by the three union federations (the two CGT –official and dissident– and 
the cTa). in the same week a national consultation also took place organized by 
the Frente Nacional contra la Pobreza (national front against poverty), an alli-
ance of the cTa and some center-left and left wing parties. its results surpassed 
the organizers’ most optimistic predictions, as three million people expressed 
their support for the proposal of a universal unemployment benefit. On the 14th 
riots and looting took place in two important cities, rosario and mendoza, gradu-
ally spreading to other districts and arriving in the Great buenos aires three days 
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later. in the latter, the climate of confusion was additionally fed by the provoca-
tive intervention of the peronist party machine. Two days later, on December 19th, 
the riots and clashes with the police in Great Buenos Aires caused the first deaths, 
some of them at the hands of retailers seeking to defend their businesses, many 
others as a result of police repression. in various places there were strikes and 
demonstrations, mostly by public employees, which targeted not just the federal 
government but also provincial and municipal ones, most of them under peronist 
rule. particularly violent street combats took place in several districts. many of 
our interviewees recall the feeling that the situation had “exploded”, which hap-
pened to make them “responsible” for what came after. The prevalent thought 
was –in the words of a former assembly member from Lanús– that “everything 
was over, we needed to do something” (female, 26, with no previous political ex-
perience). on that same night president De la rúa pronounced a televised speech 
in which he denounced the “enemies of order and of the republic”, threatened 
with repression, declared the state of siege and summoned the opposition –much 
too late– for “national unity”.
pot-banging began in buenos aires as the president was still reading his 
speech, which many of our interviewees describe as “pathetic” and “autistic”. 
once the speech was over, demonstrators began to converge spontaneously, hold-
ing their pots and pans, towards plaza de mayo, in an open and explicit challenge 
to the state of siege that had just been established. This particular element is 
underlined by most people interviewed, who concede comparatively less impor-
tance to the freezing of bank accounts and to the existence of a conspiracy to 
overthrow De la rúa as an explanation for the mobilization.
The state of siege is indeed identified by our assembly members as “the 
legal symbol of military dictatorships” and “a memory of past times”. its im-
plantation “had a decisive weight as a trigger for the people’s response” (male, 
50, left wing activist), itself a result of “so many years of activism by human 
rights organizations [that] have left an indelible mark on the brain, or in some 
place of the collective unconscious” (female, 38, foro social de la ciudad de 
buenos aires, with political and partisan experience). in that sense, the challenge 
to the state of siege signals the “closing of a historical phase that began with the 
dictatorship”. it was precisely that challenge which made it possible to re-signify 
and recover the national symbols that had been captured by the military: thus, for 
example, explains an interviewee that “i don’t like to sing the argentine anthem, 
and i believe that night i sang it, because it was a different context” (male, 49, 
journalist, asamblea de palermo Viejo, exiled during the dictatorship).
in any case, most of our interviewees agree that it was precisely when the 
state of siege was announced that the noise of pots and pans began. a few hours 
later, already in plaza de mayo, the demand that would become the hallmark 
of the political protest, still incomplete, was initially heard: que se vayan (“go 
away”). at one in the morning on December 20th the resignation of the minister 
of economy demanded by demonstrators turned into fact. six hours later it was 
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the president himself who left the Casa Rosada aboard a helicopter after signing 
his own resignation. For the first time in history, a government born out of free 
elections had been overthrown not by a military coup but by popular rejection 
expressed in the streets. it was, according to an assembly member who describes 
the day as “feverish”, “an unprecedented situation, [because] it seemed that the 
people were overthrowing a president” (male, 32, photographer, asamblea Gas-
tón riva, with little prior political experience).
The bulk of the literature devoted to the analysis of the events describes 
them in epic terms, as a situation of rupture after which nothing would remain 
the same. Under the same light they are viewed by many of the protagonists. 
although not all of our interviewees went out on the night of the 19th, those who 
did unanimously describe their nightly outing as a “wonderful” and “extraordi-
nary” moment and the events of those days as the “culmination of a great social 
process”, a “moment of rupture” or “a hinge in argentine history”. however, 
whereas some try to capture their sense by means of the classic vocabulary of 
class struggle or by analogy with other, better-known historical processes, many 
more emphasize the absolute novelty of the phenomenon.
among the many novelties, the participation of people with no prior politi-
cal experience is systematically mentioned by our interviewees, who describe the 
population as previously “asleep” as a result either of the repression that took place 
in the seventies, or of the benefits yielded by economic stability in the nineties. “It 
reminded me of the film Awakenings”, points out a former member of an assembly 
in flores. “[There was] an absolute paralysis, inertia (…) and suddenly people went 
out to the streets… i don’t think they will do that again, not even if their football 
team wins the cup” (female, 38, with political and partisan experience). among 
those who “went out” for the first time was a member-to-be of the Asamblea de 
castro barros y rivadavia that views himself as part of “the social class favored 
by menemismo” (thus, although he “saw that things were not too well”, he did not 
react before “because it didn’t affect me”). “What happened on December, 19th and 
20th”, he says, “was that i lost my innocence” (male, 36, business administrator).
also original was the fact that the openly questioned logic of representation 
was temporarily supplanted by the “logic of expression” (colectivo situaciones 
2002:15). mobilization on December 19th is indeed described as an “outbreak” or 
an “explosion”, and the state of siege is recognized as the window of opportunity 
that allowed for the free channeling of tiredness, anguish, fear or fury, among the 
many feelings repeatedly mentioned. it was all about “going out and protesting 
and making a catharsis. something that seemed very tragic suddenly turned into 
a carnival” (female, 29, sociologist, asamblea de palermo Viejo, self-described 
as “independent”). another member of the same assembly adds that “there were 
thousands and thousands of people in the streets, defying the state of siege, not 
knowing very well why they were there (…) There was a sensation of ‘wanting 
more’, although nobody knew very well of what” (male, 49, journalist, with po-
litical experience in the ‘70s and ’80s).
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along with the mainly expressive character of the demonstration, its spon-
taneous, self-summoned and unexpected nature is also systematically underlined. 
“it was a chain almost without an origin”, writes horacio González, a well-known 
sociologist. “nobody could say ‘i initiated this’, and in the Bar Británico, a few 
days later, people discussed: ‘i saw you and i began’.” (colectivo situaciones 
2002:48). A member of an assembly in Flores reflects in the same way: “I said: 
‘Who was the first to bang?’ As in a football stadium, who starts singing the 
song? There is someone who is the first one. Perhaps one day a saucepan’s lid fell 
and thus it began”. so spontaneous were the cacerolazos that in those days “no-
body knew when the next one would come”, stresses another assembly member 
(male, 49, asamblea de palermo Viejo, with prior political experience).
The act of challenge that was the nocturnal excursion of December 19th was 
also the celebration of a surprise: its protagonists were gained by the feeling that 
they were living through an historical event; the feeling of being dragged by an 
unexpected collective process that, at the same time, turned them into actors. “i 
was surprised, overwhelmed, moved as i passed by the neighborhoods and saw 
people coming out to their balconies; it was a moment of communion”, explains 
a member of the asamblea Gastón riva who says that at that precise moment 
he had the “feeling that i was living a historical moment, that i was making a 
historical moment” (male, 32, with little previous political experience). a former 






The same individuals who, in their role as an audience, had spent long hours 
following the evolution of the events on television; the same ones that had gath-
ered in front of their screens to watch the last public appearance of the president 
declaring the state of siege and that soon –still as spectators– had moved towards 
windows and balconies so as to listen and watch what was going on outside; those 
individuals became actors at the very moment when, not knowing exactly why 
–or maybe knowing that but not knowing if their own motivations were in agree-
ment with those of the others– they rushed to their kitchens to get a pot, a frying 
pan or bucket to hit, still from their windows. Those individuals became part of 
the multitude when they saw their neighbors –people that, according to many 
interviewees, they had never talked to before– with their pans at their respective 
doors and joined them, first from their own doors, soon on the street corner, later 
at some emblematic intersection or in the neighborhood park, and somewhat later, 
perhaps, on the way to plaza de mayo, or to the president’s residence in olivos, 
or to the home address of the resigned minister of economics. “people went like 
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this, almost individually… not in a collective movement”, remembers a former 
assembly member of palermo Viejo (male, 65, with no previous political experi-
ence). alone, TV sets remained on with nobody to watch them for hours, even 
for the whole night. The clothes worn by demonstrators, the company of young 
children and babies in strollers who now moved in groups along the streets was 
another sign of the unplanned character of the departure. There were no political 
parties, and only the national flag was to be seen. Another member of the same 
assembly recalls that “there were more people than placards, and placards were 
behind people and not the other way round” (male, 48, unemployed and student, 
with brief previous political experience). “people did not shout political slogans, 
it was not the usual stuff”, ratifies another assembly member, also from Palermo 
(male, 49, with long previous political experience).
The people who participated that day –acknowledges a former member of 
the same assembly– were “disorganized people, neighbors who barely recog-
nized each other” (female, 44). interviewees who identify themselves as “com-
mon citizens” accept more naturally the spontaneous character of the events; by 
contrast, those with a greater activist experience tend to express doubts about 
it. They certainly recognize they were surprised by the first cacerolazo; some 
even say they went to bed after listening to the presidential speech or that at the 
moment they were at some holiday toast or somewhere in the company of other 
activists, none of whom knew how to react. “some of us were not sure whether 
we had to go downstairs and outside. The activists were more like puzzled”, re-
members one of them. “We activists arrived after the people… that is, after the 
first people who came out with no previous organization”. But they state that later 
on the same night, activism began to “operate” providing some form of organiza-
tion. others, however, refuse to believe that such a demonstration could even be 
possible without some kind of political direction. says one of our party activists: 
“i have some doubts, as a result of the way i see politics, that mobilizations on the 
19th were just the effect of spontaneity. I find it difficult to convince myself that 
there was nobody with the political vision to summon the mobilization” (male, 
50). Those doubts become apparent in the hesitations of language; a member of 
an assembly of san cristóbal, for example, talks about the arrival of the “col-
umns” of demonstrators at the plaza to rapidly correct herself: “no, it was not 
organized in columns, we just came like this, and people converged”.
During the days of the protest a temporary suspension of previous social 
identities took place (Giarraca, 2003). our interviewees refer to it by means of 
the description of the events as a “celebration” or a “carnival”, a vortex in which 
“you were not aware of time or of where you were” (male, 29, student, asam-
blea de palermo Viejo, with no previous political experience). Thus, under one 
and the same motto a chain of equivalence among extremely diverse demands 
and reclamations was knit. central among them were the repudiation against a 
model of economic growth based on exclusion and the rejection of an inefficient, 
ineffective and corrupt political system. The slogan “que se vayan todos” (“ev-
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erybody must go away”) that was for the first time uttered in those days included 
whichever unanswered complaint was in need of the identification of a culprit.
in contrast to the happy climate of the 19th, on the 20th plaza de mayo turned 
into a battlefield and a stronghold that some people wanted to occupy and others 
wanted to clear. “The spontaneity and the family-thing of the 19th”, says a mem-
ber of the asamblea 20 de Diciembre de flores “changed on the 20th when there 
was already an action by groups minimally politicized, but politicized still. There 
were people on their own, guys in suits throwing floor tiles, inflamed. But the 
presence was very strong of politicized groups, with no party banners” (male, 33, 
party activist). “You could see four or five [acquaintances], the Mothers [of Plaza 
de mayo], their head scarves… but the activism you know, that of my generation 
was not there”, tells an assembly member of parque patricios. “The one that con-
fronted the cops was clearly another activism (…) The left was there, but it was 
outside the mayhem. (…) The left did not confront [the police]. and i saw how 
other people did: the motoqueros, the nonpartisan piquetero organizations (…) 
it was basically a rebellion of the underclass youth. (…) it was a popular rebel-
lion, but a rebellion without a leadership” (male, 54, with activist experience in 
the ‘70s). an “unruly” violence occupied the center-stage. it was an intense vio-
lence whose precedents could not be found in the guerrilla actions of the 70’s but 
“in soccer stadiums and in the rock concerts that took place in neighborhoods” 
(Colectivo Situaciones 2002:63), and also –as is mentioned by several interview-
ees– in the piquetero struggles and in puebladas (popular uprisings) such as those 
of santiago del estero (1993), cutral-có, plaza huincul (1996) and corrientes 
(1999), where the repertoire of collective action that was now re-shaped in plaza 
de Mayo was originally compiled. The final count of the two-day experience in 
December, 2001 included 35 people dead, 439 wounded and 3273 under arrest.
Despite the efforts made by various left wing political parties to lead them, 
those events did not have an author –that is, they were not summoned, started, 
guided, directed or controlled by anyone. “The main party leaders [of the left] 
were like me, drinking mate at home as they heard the noises”, states an in-
terviewee. however, as a result of the activation of the cleavage separating the 
“commoners” and the “political class” and as an effect of the subsequent division 
of the political space into two antagonistic fields, the events did indeed produce 
a subject. One of an unprecedented amplitude and an undefined character, as 
roughly a third of buenos aires’ inhabitants participated in the cacerolazos and/
or in the assemblies that followed.
after the president’s resignation, after the successive resignations of those 
who followed in the chain of succession and after two days of intense negotia-
tions, the legislative assembly (that is, both chambers of congress deliberating 
together in a special session) eventually appointed the peronist governor of san 
luis, adolfo rodríguez saá, as a substitute president with the mandate to rule 
until new elections were held on march, 3rd, 2002. a euphoric rodríguez saá 
was inaugurated on December 23rd and announced to the legislative assembly 
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the suspension of payments for the external debt and the country’s subsequent 
fall into default (thus receiving the shameful applause of his congressional audi-
ence), the promise to create a million new jobs in a month, the maintenance of the 
peso-dollar parity along with the creation of a “national third currency” (there-
fore, a concealed devaluation), the end of the “corralito” that kept savings out 
of the reach of their proprietors, and the immediate initiation of the “productive 
revolution” that had been announced –but not undertaken– by President Menem 
in 1989. Once in his seat, the new president expressed his willingness –contrary 
to his mandate– to remain there until the end of the unfinished De la Rúa’s term, 
that is, December 10th, 2003. popular demonstrations resumed when it was an-
nounced, in open contradiction with the promises made the previous day, that 
the corralito was to be maintained, and when highly criticized former members 
of menem’s government were appointed to important posts. in that context, the 
peronist governors soon undermined the new president, who finally resigned on 
new Year’s eve. in the course of the protest against rodríguez saá the battle 
cry “Que se vayan” was transformed into the well-known, definite one “Que se 
vayan todos” (“everybody must go”). in addition, a precision was added: “Que 
no quede ni uno solo” (“not a single one should stay”). indeed, neither union 
leaders nor judges were spared their share of public disbelief and rejection. What 
this cacerolazo made clear was how weak governments –and public figures in 
general– were once placed under the vigilant reflectors of an unusually alert citi-
zenship that had already successfully de facto revoked their rulers’ mandate and 
was ready to do it again if necessary.
on January 2nd, 2002 the legislative assembly appointed a new president: 
eduardo Duhalde, former governor of the province of buenos aires, powerful 
leader of the peronist party machine in the district and, paradoxically, the same 
presidential candidate defeated in 1999 by fernando De la rúa, whose term he 
was now called to complete. At the time –recalls one of our interviewees– “a 
cacerolazo took place that was not so talked about in the media. it was a holiday, 
so it did not have as much of a repercussion, but i was near the congress when the 
vote was going on and the noise of pots and pans was audible. it was a joke, to ap-
point him who came from the PJ (Partido Justicialista), from that mafia, he who 
had been with menem and who had lost the election against De la rúa” (male, 
29, sociologist, asamblea de palermo Viejo, with no prior political experience).
in the process that led from De la rúa’s resignation to the relative stabi-
lization of a substitute government around April, 2002 five presidents and six 
ministers of economy followed one another. During those months all kinds of 
conflicts took place: strikes and conflicts stemming from poverty, unemployment 
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and hunger –pickets, roadblocks, food demands and lootings– converged with 
the protest of the impoverished and attacked middle-class who verified its veto 
power through the cacerolazos and, secondarily, through verbal and sometimes 
physical attacks against politicians –identified as the most prominent people re-
sponsible for the situation. Days were “so intense”; “presidents were replaced 
all the time”, remembers an interviewee. “With each change you went out to the 
plaza; it was necessary to go there and exert pressure because the demand was for 
a constituent assembly” (male, 43, artist and university professor, ex-asamblea 
de pedro Goyena y puán, with no previous political experience).
The assembly movement as a response
to and a catalyst of the crisis
The most novel and longest-lasting product of the events of December 19th and 
20th, 2001 were the “popular” or “neighborhood” assemblies. assemblies were 
the organizational by-product of the spontaneity of the insurrectional days and 
at their origin was the experience of power. several assembly members indeed 
locate the origins of their own participation in that new feeling that “something 
could be done”:
It	was	not	the	seizure	of	power,	nor	the	foundation	of	a	party…	I	knew	




and	also	 the	Supreme	Court	 (Male,	 9,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	
with	no	previous	political	experience)
power is here understood in arendtian terms, as something that comes to ex-










racy	and	“partidocracia”,	and	to	an	understanding	of	the	slogan	“Que se vayan todos”	
as	the	call	for	the	creation	of	an	alternative	to	those	structures	in	crisis.	By	contrast,	
the	 self-named	 “neighborhood	assemblies”	 tend	 to	conceive	 the	crisis	as	 resulting	
from	the	persistent	and	excessive	delegation	of	authority	in	a	political	system	lacking	
effective	mechanisms	for	accountability	and	citizen	participation	and	control.	Con-




of common agreement. The assemblies –states a former member of one in Mont-
serrat– appeared simply because “people met their neighbors, people joined others 
and said ‘we must do something’, because they had the feeling that on that day 
they had gone out and done something” (female, 55). in fact, many assemblies 
were born in the same places and at the very moment when the self-summoned 
neighbors were taking part in the cacerolazos. a neighbor of olivos explains:

















































































or	 three	days	 later	we	saw	the	same	thing	going	on	 in	Cid	Campea-
dor.	 It	was	 then	 that	we	 decided	 to	 organize	 one	 in	 Flores.	We	 put	
up	a	couple	of	posters	summoning	people	to	Plaza	Aramburu	(…)	We	
thought	that	maybe	somebody	would	show	up,	and	we	found	out	that	













































“some of us were acquainted with those practices because we had also em-
braced them in the past”, states a member of the asamblea de palermo Viejo 
(male, 49, with prior political and partisan experience, currently an anti-global-
ization activist). “We who had some experience with that” –recalls an assembly 
member from Flores– “were all day identifying them. They all came to the as-
semblies, and a feeling grew that still persists among the population: a rejection 
against the party model and structures. You could not mention that you belonged 
to a party” (male, 47, with prior political and partisan experience). explains an-













praised by those who saw them as a superior evolutionary stage after the 
spontaneous cacerolazos and criticized by those who considered them as the 
cause for the loss of the vigor and the innocence of the spontaneous, the assem-
blies were undoubtedly one of the most novel practices grown amidst the heat of 
the representation crisis that had so violently erupted towards the end of 2001. 
The assembly movement contained an unusual revealing power of the nature of 
the crisis from which it had emerged as well as a potential for innovation beyond 
the dominant political practices. The assemblies were sites for the production 
both of discourse about a highly problematic representative bond and of political 
practices directed towards the search either of complements or of alternatives 
to the current practices of political representation. in other words, its prolifera-
tion around the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002 can be simultaneously 
understood as a symptom of the crisis of representation (and of the economic 
and social crisis as well) and –due to its nature as a producer of discourse and 
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practices related to representation– as a factor leading to the further denunciation 
and deliberate deepening of that crisis.
The assemblies were not as massive as the cacerolazos had been, because 
–unlike the latter– they demanded from their members time, patience, rhetorical 
abilities, organizational skills and/or interest in political debate. participation in 
the cacerolazos was accessible to anyone: the only requisite was to have some 
reason for complaint and to go out with a pan to express it in a space that did not 
have nor could have had any hierarchy, as there would be in the assemblies as soon 
as “natural leaderships” began to emerge. however, less than three months after 
December 19th the number of assemblies had already surpassed a hundred in the 
city of buenos aires, with a similar number in the Great buenos aires. between 
January and february, 2002 forty assemblies had also been founded in the province 
of santa fe, approximately ten in córdoba and seven more in four other provinces. 
still, the assembly movement is described by our interviewees as a “phenomenon 
of the capital city [of buenos aires]”. “We cannot say that it was a national process, 
because it was not so, but at the moment it did have national connotations because 
it was widely amplified and expanded from a political point of view” (Male, 47, 
retailer, asamblea popular de liniers, with large political experience).
Despite its low quantitative incidence –retrospectively admitted by numer-
ous interviewees, who speak of dozens or maybe a hundred members in neighbor-
hoods with tens of thousands inhabitants– the prevailing feeling throughout the 
first weeks of assembly life was that “anything could happen”, that “any change 
was possible”. “it had a multiplying effect, people came, invited neighbors, print-
ed flyers”, explains a former member of the Asamblea de Palermo Viejo (Female, 
44, with no prior political experience). “You walked by the neighborhoods and 
found assemblies here and there”, recounts a former member of the asamblea de 
flores sur. “it was impressive, everybody took part in an assembly, you went on 
the subway and you met the same people that you met at the Interbarrial, and it 
was quite a strange feeling, an effervescence” (female, 38, with prior political 
and partisan experience). at the same time, however, many of those assembly 
members were already aware of the limits of the process as they found difficulties 
in mobilizing the people who were not yet mobilized:









as far as their composition, procedures and mechanisms (more or less hori-
zontal, more or less pluralistic) were concerned, the assemblies were so different 
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from each other and internally heterogeneous as the concert of pans had been. 
Their initiatives were varied and diverse as well, ranging from the publishing of 
newspapers and bulletins or the broadcasting of radio programs to the organiza-
tion of “escraches” (graffiti protests) against politicians or the organization, coor-
dination and participation in diverse forms of protest, and including the opening 
of soup kitchens, the organization of communitarian food purchases, the elabora-
tion and distribution of all kinds of goods through local cooperatives aiming both 
at promoting self-sufficiency and autonomy and at preserving or creating jobs. 
Their mottos and demands were also as wide and diverse as the cacerolazos’ had 
been: general elections now, support for the piquetero movement (through the 
slogan “piquete y cacerola, la lucha es una sola” –“pickets and pans, the struggle 
is the same one”), participatory budgeting, the creation of mechanisms for deci-
sion-making by neighbors at the local level, the nationalization of the banking 
system, the re-nationalization of previously privatized utilities companies, the 
decision not to pay the external debt, the removal of supreme court Justices, the 
revocation of all mandates and the summoning of a national constituent assem-
bly, the end of the “corralito”, various reclamations to local and provincial gov-
ernments (ranging from the cession of physical space for meetings and activities 
to the yielding of food or medicine for distribution). among them it was possible 
to identify concrete and immediate demands related to the social crisis; classic 
vindications of small leftist parties, such as the rejection of the obligations de-
rived from the external debt; demands stemming from the negative re-interpreta-
tion of the structural reforms undertaken throughout the nineties; and, last but not 
least, many others that were the direct expression of the crisis of representation.
Political representation and the assemblies
according to their members
The discourse produced by the assemblies on the issue of political representation 
also varied widely. it included reformist stances in demand of a renovation that 
could “clean” the representative system of its evils and allow it to function cor-
rectly, as well as radically contesting positions based on the idea that representa-
tive devices were inherently evil as they had been designed precisely with the aim 
of moving the people away from a power that was rightly theirs but that makes 
domination unstable when exercised.
in the next pages we try to elucidate what political representation meant for 
assembly members; how doomed they thought it was; what their demands were in 
relation to its unfulfilled promises; and what alternatives they perceived. Did they 
demand a “more representative” democracy? or, on the contrary, did they want 






members reflect about their own assemblies? How did they understand the rela-
tionships they maintained with political parties and government institutions? Did 
they think of the assemblies as an alternative or as a supplement to other forms of 
mediation between society and the state? Did they accept the possibility of devel-
oping their activities within the framework of the existing representative institu-
tions? Did they consider them as an additional and more effective form of “citizen 
control”? Did they perceive in them some echo of other well-known participatory 
experiences, such as the brazilian participatory budgeting? Did they allow for any 
space for representation, or did they radically reject all forms of representation? 
Did they propose any specific practices at the neighborhood level that could make 
it possible to completely get rid of the distance between the rulers and the ruled?
Que se vayan todos
The motto “Que se vayan todos” (QSVT) first uttered on the rebellious final days 
of 2001 has ever since been subject to a great variety of journalistic, academic 
and political interpretations. Those interpretations are continuously framed and 
re-framed by assembly members, who thereby relate in quite different ways to 
the system of political representation.
a bulky set of interviewees maintains that the QsVT must be literally in-
terpreted. nevertheless, few of them state that the slogan simply demanded that 
“absolutely all of them” went away so as “to start anew right now” (female, 36, 
ex-asamblea de flores sur, with limited prior political experience). instead, the 
vast majority gives some specification as for the content of the expression “all”, 
which usually translates as “all those who hold seats”, “the politicians of the sys-
tem”, “the corrupt, treacherous politicians” or “the ones that have always ruled 
us”. others take a little step further to state that “all” those that should go were 
“the members of the political corporation, the judges” or those who held posi-
tions in “the three branches of the system”. What the slogan demanded was –as 
an assembly member of Almagro puts it– that “not only the politicians who have 
always ruled us and still do” should leave, “but also the whole political class, 
supposedly representative of the citizenry, which means all political institutions, 
the church, unions… the whole old way of doing politics based on clientelism, 
on the idea that ‘i give you this money, now vote for me’” (male, 36, with no 
prior political experience). in that sense, the target was “old politics” and the 
reclamation was, as some make it explicit, of a “renovation of parties” (female, 
50, asamblea de Álvarez Jonte y artigas, with little prior political experience). 
This reclamation stretched to include, after the assemblies’ experience, also the 
parties of the left, even though the latter “do not feel that the message concerns 
them, they [behave] as if they had nothing to do with it” (male, 65, ex-asamblea 
de palermo Viejo, with no prior political experience)4.
4	 	The	 left	 is	 the	 target	 of	 accusations	 of	 a	 different	nature	 from	 those	directed	
against	the	rest	of	the	parties,	blamed	for	colonizing	the	state	apparatus	with	its	cor-
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among those who interpret the slogan literally are those who no longer ap-
prehend it in terms of a “renovation” –understood either as the replacement of the 
people in charge or as the substitution of the old criticized practices– but in terms 
of the replacement of the system of representation with “another democracy”, 
described by some as “direct”, by others as “participative” and still by others as 
“more representative” than the existing one. The refusal to interpret the slogan 
as a demand for a “mere exchange of faces” is in many cases explicit; thus, for 
example, a former member of the asamblea de lanús declares that QsVT meant 
“that all the rulers had to go away but also that nobody had to come to take their 
place (…) [although] i cannot imagine what it would be like to be organized that 
way” (female, 32, with brief prior political experience). in the words of an as-





the	Zapatistas,	 the	Colombian	 guerrilla,	 the	 coca	 growers	 in	 the	 te-
rritories	where	they	function	as	a	real	popular	power	(Male,	4,	with	
union	experience)
Generally speaking, this position involves the vision of assemblies as an 
alternative to representative democracy. In the Asamblea de Palermo Viejo –re-
members one of its members “the phrase had been extended by saying ‘every-
body should go away, we’ll be in charge’” (female, 65, with no prior political 
experience). The same extended phrase is cited by an assembly member from 
pompeya, for whom it conveyed a clear message to politicians: “you cannot ad-




















years they have not found the solution. They prostituted the branches of the gov-
ernment, they led 50% of the people under the poverty line, and corruption is 
structural” (male, 57, with prolonged prior political experience).
A second set of interviewees, equally numerous as the first one, attaches 
to the QSVT a metaphorical sense, that is, a figurative, non-literal meaning that 
eases the comprehension of the phenomenon in question. in the words of a for-







as a metaphor, two main characteristics are attributed to the slogan. on one 
hand, a great capacity of symbolizing weariness, disgust and rejection towards rep-
resentatives, the representative system and even the “system” as a whole. it was, 
according to various present and former assembly participants, “a catharsis through 
refusal”, “a shout of protest and [a way] of setting a position”, “a cry of revolt”. it was 
“just an expression, a way of saying ‘we are fed up of this and we still do not know 
how to change it; we are simply fed up and we show it’”, says a member of the asam-
blea 20 de Diciembre de flores (male, 33, party activist). “it was very visceral”, con-
firms a former member of the Asamblea del Botánico. “There was no deeper analysis 
than that. it was a rebellion cry, like a rubber that you stretch to its maximum to see 
how much it bounces back. it did not stretch much because in fact they are all still 
here…” (male, 48, unemployed, with limited prior political experience).
on the other hand, the slogan is characterized by its synthetic power and 
its inclusive potential. it was “a synthesis like those that fans make in soccer 
matches”, according to a member of an assembly of flores who provides the fol-
lowing explanation:











some interviewees consider the amplitude of the slogan to be a positive trait as it 
allowed it to encompass diverse reclamations; they also contend that the phrase becomes 
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a “double-edged sword” when literally understood. others, however, use the very same 
expression to refer to the dangers involved in a slogan so “vague” and “diffuse” so as to 
encompass everybody, and therefore ready to be “appropriated by the right”.
Our interviewees –both those who understand the phrase in some literal 
way and those who emphasize its metaphorical character– are also divided as to 
whether they think the slogan is still valid, if it ever was so. in fact, some of them 
claim that they never supported it or that they stopped doing so long ago, for one 
of many reasons: its irresponsible, insufficient, excessive or negative character, or 
the obvious inevitability of its failure. There are also some (few) who reject the 
first part of the phrase –the passivity of the idea that they should go away– when in 
fact, they say, it was necessary that we got rid of them all. conversely, others (also 
in small numbers) oppose the idea that everybody should go away based on the 
argument that not all politicians are the same. “There were people [in congress] 
who, from my point of view, had performed well (…) i [even] suspected that [the 
slogan] might have been invented by the right so as to create a situation in which 
everything was mixed, everything was put at the same level”, suggests a former 
assembly member from caballito (male, 43, with no prior political experience).
As for the “irresponsible” character of the slogan, it is affirmed with at least 
two different senses. on one hand, the expression is considered to be irrespon-
sible in that “it locates responsibility outside us. [That way] nothing gets fixed. [It 
is as when we say] ‘i did not vote for him’, ‘i do not have anything to do with it’, 
‘it has been like that for a long time’” (female, 23, student, ex-asamblea de pal-
ermo Viejo, with little prior political experience). The slogan is also denounced 
as a “whim”, a result of the temporary urgencies of “the same people [who now] 
go to the demonstrations [in demand for a “zero-tolerance” policy against crime] 
led by Blumberg” (who is systematically identified by the interviewees as “right-
ist”) (female, 26, ex-asamblea de lanús, with no prior political experience). on 
the other hand, the phrase is considered to be a product of the “unconsciousness”, 
the “lack of thought” about the results of its eventual application. “You can’t 
tell everybody to go away because if you are governed then comes mr. George 
W. [bush] and tells you: ‘i will rule for you’”, says a former member of the 
asamblea de olivos (female, 45, volunteer in a popular library, with political ex-
perience and party affiliation). However, the most common reference to the irre-
sponsibility of the phrase –described as “ridiculous”, “childish”, “misadjusted”, 
“impulsive” and “meaningless” – appears in between interrogation marks: “If 
everybody goes away, who is going to come?” The question is frequently asked 
alongside the ascertainment of the assemblies’ failure at “occupying the space” of 
those who had to go, and/or of the failure of “the people” at organizing an alterna-
tive and rising up to the challenge that was the result of their own demands.
The phrase is denounced either for its excessive (and, therefore, impossible) 
character or for its insufficiency. “Nobody went away”, states a member of the 
asamblea Gastón riva. “These all-or-nothing positions are all the same, and it 
ends up this way. We wanted everything and we got nothing” (male, 32, with 
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little prior political experience). Those who consider the slogan to be insufficient, 
on the other hand, are mostly party activists and assembly members with a vast 
prior political and partisan experience who criticize the alleged reformist stance 
of the vast majority of the mobilized citizenry:







The insufficiency of the slogan is also linked to its “exclusively negative” charac-
ter. consequently, the lack of a “positive” alternative is pointed out as a problem 
by many assembly members –mostly party activists– who claim to have tried to 
solve it by organizing groups parallel to the assemblies whose aim was to allow 
for “strategic political discussion”.
in any case, the majority of our interviewees consider that as for its practi-
cal effects, the slogan was a failure. “nothing changed”, “nobody went away”, 
“little changed so nothing fundamental was changed” are some of the expressions 
typically used. A few people, however, affirm that assemblies were instrumental 
in changing the vision of previously passive citizens and in creating a sort of 
state of alert, as well as greater sensitivity and responsiveness on the part of the 
government elected in 2003. The latter is indeed recognized by many as having 
picked up through words and deeds the heritage left by the demands originally 
put forward by caceroleros and asambleístas.
Assemblies and representative institutions
The relationship with the local government
A minority of our interviewees emphatically affirm that their assemblies main-
tained no relationship with the Centro de Gestión y Participación (cGp)5 in the 
neighborhood because they wanted to remain faithful to the QsVT, thus rejecting 
all relationship with the government, political parties and institutions in general. 



















in contrast, many others declare that their assemblies went through severe internal 
conflict about whether to accept or reject anything offered by the CGP; about 
whether to make requests, or demands, or even to “just go and seize” whatever 
resources were considered to belong to “the people” by their own right –such as a 
place to meet. still more numerous are those who categorically maintain that their 
assemblies had some kind of relationship with the cGp or with the city govern-
ment (and, to a lesser extent, with other institutions). Those relations were, accord-
ing to the majority, “unavoidable”, of a utilitarian nature and based on “permanent 
demand”. from this perspective, the cGp was a mere source from which diverse 
resources could be “obtained” or, better still, “taken”; a place where requests or 
demands could be directed and that could be repudiated or even attacked if de-
mands were not appropriately met. This sort of relationship is frequently (though 
not always) defined as “conflictive”6. only a handful of interviewees describe a 
relationship that was “friendly” or “adult” due to a certain ideological affinity, to 
“governmental good will”, to the recognition by the assembly of some virtue in 
certain official policies, or to mutual respect. The obtaining of resources (physi-
cal space, food to distribute or to feed the soup kitchen, social plans, housing 
subsidies, etc.) or of favorable decisions such as the recognition and legalization 
of assemblies’ activities are consequently understood mainly as the effect of the 
“struggle” led by the assemblies and of their “pressures” on a government de-
picted either as in need of “cleaning its public image” or as “scared” by social 
















































































































there	are	numerous	indications	of	 the	 importance	that	 is	attributed	
to	the	State.	Some	even	admit	that	it	might	not	be	so	desirable	after	
all	that	everybody	goes	away.	That	is	the	case	of	the	former	member	
of	 the	Asamblea	 de	 Pedro	Goyena	 y	 Puán	who	 remembers	 that	 on	
December	0th,	00,	he	was	scared	when	“seeing	those	people	break	
the	door	and	enter	the	Congress	building	(…)	It	gave	me	the	idea	that	

























































































sions	made	were	 simply	not	 implemented.	 “Today	 something	 is	de-




























The stance towards the 2003 presidential elections
The	re-arranging	of	 the	political	 scene	and	 the	occurrence	of	presi-
dential	elections	less	than	a	year	and	a	half	after	the	outburst	of	po-
litical	protest	posed	a	difficult	challenge	for	the	assemblies.	Accord-
ing	 to	most	 interviewees,	 assemblies	 did	 not	 establish	 an	 “official”	
position	towards	the	election,	that	is,	no	guidelines	to	be	followed	by	
their	members,	but	instead	they	granted	them	–according	to	the	most	
























slogan	‘Que se vayan todos’. Most	of	us	went	to	vote	with	that	ticket	
and	we	distributed	it	in	the	neighborhood”	(Male,	6,	with	no	previ-
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who	formulate	them.	In	other	words,	deliberation	requires	horizon-





























ment	 for	me	to	speak	approaches,	 I	keep	changing,	adding	 things	 to	






assemblies are therefore ideally thought of as a space where politics is no 
longer monopolized by experts but recovered by and for citizens. according to 
a member of the asamblea de palermo Viejo, participants in assembly debates 
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are “people” or “citizens”, not “specialists”; if that were not the case, “a citizen 
would be like the dentist’s patient, who cannot say anything; the only thing he 
can do is keep his mouth open and abstain from complaining if it hurts” (male, 
48, with prior political and partisan experience).
assembly discussions encompassed subjects as diverse as imaginable, at 
the most varied levels of abstraction and generality. “from growing vegetables 
in a communitarian garden to the socialist revolution, supporting iraq’s or af-
ghanistan’s struggle… it was very eclectic, very strange” (male, 36, asamblea 
de castro barros y rivadavia, with no previous political experience). Debate 
took place about “the country’s problems, the problems of the economy, health 
and education policies, the situation of the political regime” (male, 47, asamblea 
popular de liniers, with long prior political activism), as well as about how to 
undertake a certain task or how to express solidarity with the neighborhood’s car-
toneros7, or about attendance to the following mobilization or to the Asamblea 
Interbarrial, or on the content of a flyer to be printed so as to let neighbors know 
about an activity organized or a stance taken by the assembly.
The level of abstraction of debates was itself turned into a subject for discus-
sion within assemblies, as well as into the object of accusations and misunder-
standings among them. indeed, some assemblies were regularly criticized for their 
alleged “elitist”, “theorizing” and “pseudo-intellectual” tendencies. Whereas some 
assemblies devoted most time to the discussion of “everyday issues”, “problems of 
the neighborhood” and “real needs”, explains a member of the asamblea popular 
de pompeya, others “discussed the law of gravitation” (male, 57, with long prior 
political experience). The accusation is denied by some members of the criticized 
assemblies, whereas others acknowledge that the “high intellectual level” of their 
assemblies, where “very interesting and rich debates took place” (in contrast to those 
“with a shallower composition and a much simpler language”) eventually produced 
tensions, splits and desertions. This effect attributed to “professional knowledge” is 
in other cases equally blamed on the prevalence of “activist knowledge”.
similar discussions took place about the level at which activities were to be 
undertaken, that is, about whether “to work within the neighborhood or at a more 
general level” (nevertheless, in many cases the solution was found in the organi-
zation of committees where “each one could work on what he wanted”. The de-
bate about the scope to be conferred to assemblies’ actions was frequently shaped 
as a confrontation between “common neighbors” and “revolutionary activists”. 
Thus, for example, when the asamblea 20 de Diciembre from parque avellaneda 
discussed the position to adopt in response to the decline of the cacerolazos, “the 
orthodox leftist sectors [that] considered that the situation was ripe for an at-
tack against central power strongly opposed any kind of work at the local level” 
(male, 41, with union experience).
7	 	The	term	is	applied	to	the	unemployed	who	make	a	living	from	collecting	cardboard	
and	paper	from	trash	bags	in	the	streets	and	selling	them	to	recycling	companies.
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assembly meetings are usually described as “chaotic”. “it was almost im-
possible to fix an agenda, not to talk about following it”, states a former member 
of the asamblea de núñez (male, 54, with previous political experience). it is 
frequently underscored by activists turned into assembly members as well as by 
assembly members turned into activists that in those conditions it was impossible 








Thus, it was not long before “official” opportunities for political discussion 
were confined to special events –typically, all-day weekend activities organized 
around the presentation and discussion of some specific subject– and to special-
ized committees (“committee for political analysis”, “discussion workshop”, 
“debate group”) aimed at “synthesizing” and “raising issues” that were to be later 
introduced into the plenary assembly. This notwithstanding, substantial debates 
continued to take place in assemblies all the time, usually triggered by practical 
issues. “everything in the assembly led to political discussion”, states a member 
of the asamblea de castro barros y rivadavia. “from setting up a soup kitchen 
to whether or not to distribute food packets” (male, 36, with no prior political 
experience). according to an activist from flores, heated discussions about the 
legitimacy of private property took place there when the possibility was consid-
ered of seizing an unoccupied estate as the cold weather made it impossible to 
continue meeting outdoors. in other assemblies, social issues and policies, gov-
ernmental handouts and social rights were thoroughly discussed each time prob-
lems arose related to the organization of the assembly’s solidarity undertakings. 
last but not least, as a result of its unprecedented character assemblies displayed 
still another noteworthy trait: that of hosting a score of self-reflective practices, 
including constant discussion about what an assembly was and should be and 
what their horizontal practices were about.
Vote or Consensus
a widely discussed issue was that of the decision-making procedures that were more 







by equally numerous groups of interviewees as the form adopted by decision-mak-
ing in their own assemblies: the holding of a vote and the search for consensus.
Whereas some people assume that decision by majority vote is the “natural” 
decision-making process due to its “obviously” democratic character, others say 
that their assemblies only embraced it at the beginning and just for quantitative 
reasons, or as a last resource when consensus was impossible to reach due either 
to special circumstances, or to the peculiarity of the issue under discussion, but 
that it was abandoned as soon as assemblies shrank due to desertions or when 
splits increased their homogeneity9. it is for the very same reasons that some in-
terviewees state that while the search for consensus was the usual practice within 
committees, decisions in plenary meetings were made by means of a vote by 
show of hands. others, however, express their preference for consensus on the 
claim that its effects were less divisive, and out of the conviction that “more 
people will follow a decision made by the whole” (male, 36, asamblea de castro 
barros y rivadavia, with no previous political experience).
both those that vindicate voting and those who prefer consensus (frequently 
identified with harmony, especially by those with little political experience) do it 
out of the conviction that the procedure of their choice is the most “horizontal” 
and “democratic” one. at the same time, criticisms directed both to voting and 
to consensus (and especially to the latter, often described as “more original” and 
“more difficult” to practice) are centered on two issues: their democratic defi-
ciencies and their operational limitations. “i am not going to tell you that [con-
sensus] is that democratic (…) people who disagreed on something left”, says a 
member of the multisectorial de san cristóbal (female, 31 years, party activist). 
“Those who are used to activism do not find any trouble in debating [in search 
for consensus]. but there are other neighbors who are not used to it”, points out 
a former member of the asamblea de olivos (male, 60, with political experience 
and party affiliation), implicitly maintaining that regarding voting, by contrast, 
everybody stands on an equal footing. in any case, both discussion in the search 
for consensus and voting as a way of settling a discussion are admittedly subject 
to manipulation and “aparateadas” –that is, to the intervention of party activists 





less”,	confesses	a	 former	member	of	 the	Asamblea	del	Botánico.	 “It	 took	soooooo	
































Along with the deficiencies of both mechanisms in terms of democratic quality, 
also the quality of the resulting decisions is put into question. The consensual 
practice is the preferred target for the second type of criticisms. Whereas some 
consider as an unavoidable side effect the fact that proposals on which agree-
ment cannot be reached are left aside so as to avoid conflict, others take it as a 
severe structural problem located at the root of assemblies’ lack of agility and ef-
ficacy. The latter is the stance taken by several interviewees who repeatedly point 
out that through consensus “very few” or “too obvious” things could be decided 
–things such as going out and protest against the presence in the neighborhood 
of a former dictatorship’s public official or to attend a demonstration on the an-
niversary of the 1976 military coup. but decisions reached through consensus 
on more controversial issues were “liquified”; that is the reason why a vote was 
resorted to “when the issue deserved it”. “The search for consensus”, explains a 
former member of the asamblea de núñez, “is like a polishing process that goes 
on until the thing is totally blunt and does not cut anymore”. in addition, it is “not 
very operational”: “there is maybe one person in disagreement and you spend 
five hours braining yourself to approach positions with whatever the guy thinks” 
(male, 54, with previous political experience). several interviewees also add the 
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inconvenience that decisions thus made do not leave anybody happy, so they do 
not prompt enough commitment at the time of implementation.
The most radical criticism against the assembly format, though, is that which 
contests both decision-making mechanisms on the basis of the ascertainment of 
a link between emergency, decision and leadership. in the words of a former as-
sembly member from olivos:
You	cannot	live	in	a	permanent	state	of	assembly.	(…)	Some	decisions	
have	to	be	urgently	made,	there	must	be	some	representation,	a	small	




The arising of leaderships
Horizontality	was	not	 just	 a	 practice	 but	 also	 an	 aim	 that	was	 “al-
most	obsessively”	pursued.	“Everything	was	democratically	decided”,	














have	 been	 avoided;	 the	 majority	 considers	 it	 instead	 as	 a	 natural	



































Thus,	 for	 example,	 the	 authority	 recognized	 to	 the	 “old	 guard”,	 that	
is	to	say,	to	“the	comrades	who	formed	the	assembly,	who	worked	for	
its	construction”	(Male,	4,	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	with	











some	 decision	 power	 amounts	 to	 the	 definite	 loss	 of	 horizontality.	
According	to	others,	however,	horizontality	 is	able	 to	survive,	albeit	







tablished	 political	 institutions.	 In	 the	 former,	 but	 not	 in	 the	 latter,	
compliance	was	 voluntary	 and	 leaderships	 needed	 to	 be	 constantly	












the	 biggest	 responsibilities	 to	 the	 one	 who	 participates	 less”	 could	
discuss	on	an	equal	footing.	“Management	requires	different	degrees	










Participation in the Assembly of assemblies:
Representatives or delegates?









What	 interests	 us	 here	 is	 the	 charge	 that	 true	 deliberation	was	 ab-
sent	 from	 it	 due	 to	 partisan	 interferences.	 Several	 interviewees	 tell	
that	 parties	 “came	 with	 their	 party	 programs	 and	 discussed	 them	




the	 vote	 took	 place	 at	 the	 last	minute,	when	 three	 quarters	 [of	 the	






















Interferences	 of	 parties	were	 real,	 and	 parties	were	 indeed	 res-
ponsible	 for	 the	 scandalous	 ending	of	 the	 Interbarrial meetings.	Ne-
vertheless,	their	behavior	was	contingent.	How	different	would	things	







with	 limited	prior	political	experience).	 “This	 relapse	on	representa-
0	 	Dictionary	definitions	 for	both	 terms	are	 similar	and	 include	 reciprocal	 refer-






















tood	as	a	mechanism	 to	avoid	 specialization;	as	a	 former	assembly	
member	from	Lanús	Centro	puts	it,	it	was	“a	form	of	[avoiding	that]	
people	were	 type-cast	according	 to	 the	duties	 they	perform”	and	of	
preventing	the	concentration	of	power	that	results	from	“always	doing	
































































under	 the	 form	of	 consistent	 alternatives,	 and	 in	 various	 combina-
tions.	Among	them	can	be	mentioned	the	rejection	of	the	separation	






























For	 some	 assembly	members,	 assemblies	 embodied	 a	 “political	
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latter,	a	former	member	of	the	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo	concludes	




decline	 –or,	 according	 to	 some,	 the	 failure–	 of	 the	 assembly	move-
ment,	most	 (if	not	all)	our	 interviewees	believe	 that	 the	causes	 that	
originally	fueled	it	still	remain	in	place.	Many	of	them,	however,	no	










state	 that	 the	assembly	movement	 failed	because	 it	was	not	 radical	
enough,	as	it	did	not	thoroughly	reject	“the	republican	and	represen-
tative	 regime,	 so	when	 the	 government	 says	 ‘go	 vote	 again’,	 people	
just	go	and	vote	again.	(…)	The	change	was	not	so	deep,	that	is	why	

























ssive”	 characteristics	 of	 the	 “normalizing”	Kirchner	 administration,	
which	–they	claim–	felt	compelled	to	incorporate,	at	least	through	lip	
service,	many	of	the	reclamations	put	forward	by	mobilized	citizens.
The	 assembly	 experience	 also	 resulted	 in	 the	 reformulation	 of	
many	participants’	 prior	 expectations,	 not	 just	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 uto-
pian	character	of	 certain	hopes	 that	grew	 in	 the	context	of	Decem-
ber,	00,	but	also	where	certain	aspects	of	representative	systems	are	
concerned.	More	precisely,	the	experience	allowed	for	the	evaluation	



















the	constitution	of	a	 self-selected	group	of	 leaders	 formed	by	 those	
who	have	the	time,	resources,	charisma	or	interest	to	devote	full-time	
to	politics?	Professional	politicians	would	no	 longer	score	so	 low	 if	
compared	to	such	an	aristocracy,	free	of	the	constraints	of	any	insti-









ting	 in	many	ways,	as	most	of	 their	 former	members	easily	admit	






experience	 itself,	 related	 in	 turn	 to	 the	 stark	 contrast	between	 the	
huge	expectations	it	fostered	and	the	modest	outcomes	it	produced.	











































the	 constitution	 of	 a	 “virtual	 electorate”	 –that	 is,	 by	 following	 the	
dictates	of	public	opinion.	Some	“progressive”,	even	“politically	co-
rrect”	decisions	were	rapidly	enacted.	Until	mid-term	congressional	
elections	were	held	 in	 005,	 alleged	 attempts	 at	 “political	 reform”	
(a	collection	of	disparate	changes	 in	political	practices	 that,	 if	 en-
acted,	would	supposedly	turn	representative	democracy	into	either	
a	more	 representative,	 a	more	 responsive,	 a	more	 accountable	 or	
a	more	direct	one)	continued	 to	make	headlines.	Halfway	 into	his	
term,	 though,	 President	Kirchner	 succeeded	 in	 turning	 his	 virtual	
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Other sources
-Periodical	publications,	digital	versions	(Clarín,	La Nación, 
Página/12, 3 Puntos)
-Public	opinion	data,	http://www.nuevamayoria.com.
-00	and	00	Electoral	Results:	Secretaría	Electoral,	Ministerio	del	
Interior,	República	Argentina.
-Indymedia	Argentina	,Centro	de	Medios	Independientes,	http://
argentina.indymedia.org.	
-Information	and	material	produced	by	the	assemblies,	available	on	
their	web	sites	and	on	leftist	parties’	web	sites.	
-Decisions	by	the	Asamblea	Interbarrial,	listed	on	http://www.po.org.
ar/asambleas.
